INTRODUCTION
This article looks at particular recommendations made by Lord Justice Jackson in his review of the costs of civil litigation.
1 In a two volume report running to over a thousand pages he proposes to make radical changes. If the complex, inter-related reforms are all introduced, they would be even more significant than those procedural changes set in train by Lord Woolf fifteen years ago. 2 The proposals have been much discussed by the legal profession but, as yet, they have largely escaped the attention of academic law journals. 3 They received support in a recent report on compensation culture, 4 and the Government have announced that they are to form the foundation for its reform of civil litigation. The Jackson proposals are to be taken forward as a matter of priority.
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Here the focus is upon one particular issue: the potential use of before-the-event insurance (BTE). This is insurance against future legal costs that was in place before the event which gave rise to the claim, such as the accident which caused the injury. It is sometimes referred to as legal expenses insurance, although that term can also include after-the-event insurance (ATE) where a policy is taken out after the accident in order to cover the risk of having to pay the opponent's legal costs. Although this article therefore has a narrow focus it nevertheless makes wider points about the problems identified by the Jackson report and the solutions it proposes. Reforming (2010) . This is a report to the Prime Minister following a Whitehall-wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of the compensation culture, and at p 22 it recommends that Jackson's proposals be adopted as soon as possible.
http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/402906_CommonSense_acc.pdf 5 
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practitioners; but whether it could offer a more workable solution than some of those put forward by Jackson may provoke a more favourable response. The argument here is that more attention should be paid to BTE than has previously been the case: it may hold the key to access to justice for many potential litigants.
SHIFTING THE COST FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE SOURCES
Against a political background where all parties agree that substantial cuts in public expenditure are required, it is not realistic to expect much support for an increase in public funding to enable civil cases to be litigated. 6 It is to private funding that we must turn if we seek to make it easier to obtain civil redress. However, we should not forget that until recently public funding for personal injury cases was common. Where would we be now had it remained available?
The question is an unusual one because legal aid for such claims already seems to be a relic from the remote past, and there is no suggestion that it should be revived. 8 This is actually a 7 per cent increase compared to two years previously, but this reflects only a downturn in the economy not an increase in eligibility rates. See Final Report n 1 above p 68 para 3.1.
"public funding" is now a "no win, lower fee" conditional fee agreement for the socially excluded only, but without a success fee for taking the risk of losing.'
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That is, if solicitors accept legal aid cases today, they must work at very low rates which cannot be increased in the event of claims being won. Marshall suggests that by now, in an unreformed system, solicitors in high value cases would have been forced to fund litigation by using contingency fees with clients paying lawyers from the damages they were awarded. As for the mass of low value claims, solicitors would have abandoned the work and left it to unqualified claims assessors. We would have a very different tort system.
The Access to Justice Act 1999 removed almost all legal aid for personal injury cases. As a substitute, it encouraged the use of conditional fee agreements (CFAs) which had first been made lawful only four years earlier. 10 Claimant lawyers could secure an increase in their fees in each case that they won under such an arrangement.
They could recover up to double their costs if they were successful, but nothing at all if they lost. 11 Claimants themselves were encouraged to litigate under these "no-win, no fee" deals because the only financial risk to which they were exposed was liability for the defendant's costs if the case was lost. Even though in most cases this risk was only a remote one, further protection was at hand: for a suitable premium, ATE insurance could be arranged so as to relieve the claimant of any concern over funding his claim. Damages could thus be sought at no financial risk to the claimant. This is his "most urgent" reform.
To offset this, he makes two other sets of recommendations in favour of claimants.
He does so in an attempt to reduce the risk that, because of the changes, they may have to pay for their lawyer's success fee and for the premium charged for their ATE.
First, he proposes that there be one-way cost shifting in personal injury cases so as to obviate the need for ATE. 16 This means that whereas the defendant will continue to pay the claimant's costs if the case succeeds, if it fails no claim for costs can be made by the defendant. To a large extent this reflects current practice because costs against 13 Final Report n 1 above, para 3.26.
14 Final Report n 1 above, para 4.19.
15 Final Report n 1 above, para 2.2.
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claimants are seldom recovered, and defendants therefore derive little benefit from the existing two-way cost shifting. Instead they will now benefit much more by not having to pay the claimant's ATE premiums. One-way cost shifting is seen as the simpler and cheaper alternative because claimants will not have to pay for any insurance.
The second set of proposals aimed at protecting claimants deal with the risk that they may now have to meet the cost of any success fee out of their own pocket.
Jackson begins by imposing a limit upon the level of this success fee: it is not to exceed a quarter of the damages paid excluding any compensation awarded for future economic loss. This may be a difficult calculation to make given that damages in settled cases are rarely agreed across all or even any heads of damage and it is only the bottom line figure that is accepted by both sides. To enable claimants more easily to pay the success fee Jackson also proposes that general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity be increased by ten per cent. 17 This increase is intended to leave the great majority of claimants whose claims settle early no worse off than at present, although the empirical evidence for this balancing act equating the cost of the success fee with the rise in damages has not been made public. In criticism of the proposal one London law firm, after carrying out a study of its own cases, concluded that in serious injury cases claimants would suffer considerably. It found that where damages exceeded £250,000 the average claimant would be £47,000 worse off.
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In line with his opposition to unnecessary costs, Jackson is in favour of extending the present fixed costs regime. This applies to road traffic cases which settle before issue for up to £10,000. 19 He would extend the scheme to all personal injury cases decided in the fast track, that is, for cases up to £25,000. 20 To further limit costs Jackson also proposes a ban on referral fees in personal injury cases or, as a fallback position, that at least they be capped at £200. 21 Referral fees are payments made to third parties for introducing work to the firm. Although commonly associated with claims management companies trawling for accident business, referral fees are also paid to BTE insurers for passing on cases to those firms they choose to appoint to their panel. The Government recognises that the future of referral fees is especially contentious and is awaiting the result of further consultation before expressing its view. Jackson summarises what he hopes will be the overall result of his proposals:
(i) Most personal injury claimants will recover more damages than they do at present, although some will recover less.
(ii) Claimants will have a financial interest in the level of costs which are being incurred on their behalf.
(iii) Claimant solicitors will still be able to make a reasonable profit.
(iv) Costs payable to claimant solicitors by liability insurers will be significantly reduced.
(v) Costs will also become more proportionate, because defendants will no longer have to pay success fees and ATE insurance premiums.
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JACKSON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BTE IN AN EXPANDING CLAIMS MARKET
With these various proposals and objectives in mind, how ought we to view the possibilities for BTE? In his preliminary report Jackson was enthusiastic about BTE, tentatively concluding that promoting its substantial extension would be in the public interest. 27 However, eight months later this support evaporated and his final report is largely non-committal. He makes no recommendation either for or against the use of BTE in personal injury cases, although as an add-on to household insurance he considers it a beneficial product which should be encouraged. 28 He notes that, as with all other insurance, it would enable the many to pay for the few. However, overall he gives little space to BTE, devoting only nine pages of the 557 in the report to the subject and making only one recommendation about it out of over a hundred made in total. Why did he not consider in more detail the possible extension of BTE in relation to personal injury especially following his radical proposals to change existing sources of funding? Before answering this question, we shall look briefly at the remarkable growth of BTE and the type of personal injury cases that are presently being litigated.
26 Final Report n 1 above, para 2.7.
27 Preliminary Report n 1 above, para 4.5.
28 Final Report n 1 above, para 7.1.
Although BTE has been widely used in other countries for many years, it was first sold in the UK only in 1974. 29 There had been little demand for it partly because people were often unaware of the risk of incurring legal costs and, in any event, there was a competitor -the protection offered by legal aid. Insurers also faced difficulties in pricing the insurance when the cost of litigation was much less predictable in the UK than in other countries. Given the relatively few years during which BTE has been offered, it is remarkable that eligibility for its benefits has expanded so rapidly: almost 3 in 5 adults now have some form of this insurance. 30 Over 18 million drivers hold it as part of their motor insurance, and 14 million householders as part of their buildings and contents insurance. In total these number about 22 million people. 31 In addition,
for example, about 7 million workers are entitled to BTE benefits resulting from their trade union membership, although this is a declining number.
This wide penetration of the market has been achieved largely because BTE has been sold as an additional benefit to be included in existing motor liability or household insurance. In effect, there has been a great deal of inertia selling. Few people opt to take out stand alone BTE policies, but they commonly accept legal 34 The current figure is published by the Compensation Recovery Unit www.dwp.gov.uk/otherspecialists/compensation-recovery-unit/performance-and-statistics/performance-statistics/ country. Motor claims have increased at almost twice that overall rate rising from 102,000 to 674,000. They have increased by 22 per cent in the last two years alone.
With the continuing decline in work accident claims, motor cases now constitute 78 per cent of all the claims made. BTE is thus operating in a much expanded litigation system from when it first began, and the number and proportion of motor claims has risen very considerably. If any reform were specifically directed at road traffic accidents it could have a major effect upon the system overall. Jackson should have concentrated his attention in this area.
THE POTENTIAL REFORM OF BTE
The suggestion put forward here is that legal advice could be more easily available if, when forced to purchase insurance against liability in tort, every motorist were also required to take out BTE as an addition to the policy. The insurance would benefit not only the policyholder and the passengers, but also any pedestrians or other roadusers injured by the insured vehicle. The mechanism for effecting the change -compulsory third party insurance against motor liability -already exists. As others have often noted, it would be relatively easy to build upon it. 35 By doing so access to justice could be secured for three out of four claims presently brought.
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A proposal along these lines was included as part of wider reforms put forward by the Bar's Contingency Legal Aid Fund (CLAF) Group. However, the Group proposed Lord Neuberger MR recently has argued that no-fault should again be examined by policymakers if we fail to achieve proportionate costs in personal injury litigation.
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/mr-piba-conf-march-2010.pdf 36 Note 34 above and associated text.
that BTE be extended in a much more ambitious manner from that being discussed here. The CLAF scheme sought to include not only motorists but also employers and occupiers and others. These latter groups would each insure respectively for the benefit of those injured at work, or on premises, or elsewhere. Even those injured in hospital would be covered. In addition, the Group suggested that protection could be extended to include, for example, those suffering a loss as a result of the act of a person required to have professional liability insurance cover. According to the Group the overall result would be that … access to justice for the general public would be increased at no cost to the taxpayer and with none of the disadvantages inherent in CFAs and many additional advantages.
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However, not only is this is a very much broader and more complex scheme than that now being put forward, but it is also based on mistaken assumptions. For example, it is not the case that occupiers must insure as a matter of law. Instead of supporting this broad scheme, the suggestion here is that we concentrate only upon road traffic cases, albeit with many of the same goals in mind.
The main advantage of a motor scheme is that those injured will have ready access to legal advice and a fund to cover their costs should their case fail. There would be less need than at present to arrange unsatisfactory or expensive funding such as loans to claimants to cover the cost of their disbursements. Nor would there be the same need to resort to what would be an excessively complicated post-Jackson CFA world.
As an example of that complexity we are asked to accept that claimants will make reasoned choices between law firms based on their competitive marketing of success fee levels. This is hard to imagine. Indeed, in a key sentence in the report, Jackson admits that there would be difficulties in devising such advertising. Instead he sees the future as inevitably involving claims brought on a contingent fee basis: 'Clients will 37 http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/assets/documents/CCF%20Paper%202%20April%202009.pdf at paras no doubt find it easier to grasp the concept of a deduction of a percentage of their damages and solicitors will find it easier to advertise on that basis.'
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The difficulties involved in Jackson's proposal for a regulated system of contingent fees are not discussed in detail here. 39 However, that proposal is a major alternative with which the possibilities for BTE should be compared.
Following an increase in ready access to legal advice, the second advantage claimed for the BTE proposal is that the system would be more efficient than at present because the costs of pursuing the case would be more closely monitored by the claimant's side. Unlike claimants at present, BTE insurers would be directly affected by the costs of bringing the case. They would be able to sift claims, using a merits test
to weed out those which should not be pursued further. They would then be able to channel claimants to those who specialise in providing the representation needed. A good comparator, from this viewpoint, is the way in which trade unions at present enable injured workers to gain expert advice from the handful of specialist firms to which unions direct cases. What are the flaws in such a comparison and where might the difficulties with an extension of BTE lie?
THE DIFFICULTIES
Choice of Lawyer
At present BTE limits the freedom to choose one's own lawyer because claimants are directed to use firms which are on the firm's approved panel. 40 These firms may be located a considerable distance from the claimant's home. Firms are selected for the panel after a closed bidding process intended to ensure that insurers are exposed to the 38 Final Report n 1 above, para 2.5.
39 But see n 23 above and associated text. There are strict service level agreements and audits of the work carried out. At present these firms also pay the insurer a referral fee for each case received. Many non-panel solicitors object to these features. However, one claimant lawyer has recently argued strongly that these criticisms are without foundation and merely reflect firms' own economic interests. 41 Here it is suggested that, for several reasons, too much weight should not be placed upon the argument that BTE unduly limits the claimant's freedom to choose his solicitor.
Firstly, it is doubtful whether many claimants in any event make informed choices when selecting their solicitor. In spite of extensive advertising, there is little useful information enabling them to discriminate between firms easily. Where guidance exists, in practice it is rarely used. Secondly, the freedom to choose is restricted in other situations and yet attracts little criticism. In particular, when workers take from when formal proceedings are issued. 44 In spite of this, it must be recognised that injured people in practice are still encouraged to accept a panel solicitor even though it may not always be convenient for them to do so.
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Jackson is equivocal in his support of choice. On the one hand, he is prepared to support an amendment to the regulations to reinforce the claimant's right to choose his own lawyer from an earlier date than he is allowed at present: the freedom should exist from when a letter of claim is first sent rather than only from the later date of when formal proceedings are issued. On the other hand, he qualifies this view by stating that this change is only to be made if its impact upon the premiums charged for BTE would be modest. 46 From what has been said above, the problem of choice may not now be as significant as some may suppose, although the informal pressure to accept a panel solicitor remains.
Quality of Legal Work
There are fears that BTE lawyers will not represent their clients as vigorously as those operating on a different fee basis. The Trades Union Congress simply states that their quality of service is suspect. 47 In part this is because of conflicts of interest that may arise. For example, in litigation in 2001 it was estimated that Norwich Union could be both representing the defendant driver and funding the claimant driver in just over six per cent of all its claims. 48 More generally, there is concern that BTE lawyers may be too ready to compromise a case at a low figure in order to avoid the possibility and his lawyer has been said to affect the quality of the work done, or at least the claimant's perception of the how well he is being treated. In their defence, insurers argue that cases are more efficiently dealt with by a specialised team able to use email and telephone contact albeit at some distance from the claimant. This may be especially the case when dealing with the mass of low value motor vehicle claims.
However, in the few cases which involve serious injury the potential loss of personal contact could be important. The claimant could ensure that contact is possible by insisting upon choosing a local lawyer. There is concern that the financial limits set by the BTE policy may be too low, and this restricts the work that can be done for the claimant and, in particular, hampers the ability to take matters to trial. Commonly a policy may confine the insurer's liability to a ceiling of £50,000, and also excludes cover for certain types of claim such as clinical negligence or disease. However, these limits are much less significant here because they are usually sufficient for the mass of fast track motor claims of concern in this article. In addition, the level of cover could be increased by the insurer if there is a high chance of success. However, this may be only a theoretical option because these are just the cases where a speedy, low cost resolution might be expected.
Amount of Work
Overall, as yet, there is no empirical evidence to support these various fears about the quality of work done in BTE cases, and the concerns do not apply to the vast majority of road accident claims.
Cost of Insurance
At present the premiums for add-on BTE are exceptionally low, being only about £20 for motor 51 and slightly less for household policies. However, if we look at premiums for BTE in Europe the cost is much higher because the scope of the insurance cover provided is much wider and costs are not recoverable. The typical premium for a stand-alone policy is well over £200. If we then look at the typical premium charged for ATE the cost is higher again. In a fast track road traffic case about £350 would be paid, and for other types of claim almost double that sum. 52 ATE premiums for industrial disease cases cost £1,000 each. For cases above the fast track limit of £25,000 premiums rise further so that even for a road traffic case about £1,500 would be paid. These higher figures are sometimes cited to illustrate the fear that the cost of BTE insurance could rise significantly if the present regime were to 51 Preliminary Report n 1 above, para 2.1. 52 See the current adverts in the journal Litigation Funding and the general discussion in the Preliminary Report n 1 above para 2.3.
change. Although Jackson gave no detailed figures, he was persuaded that this might happen. There are several reasons for his fears.
Firstly, if referral fees are abolished, as Jackson proposes, insurers would suffer a significant loss and this would have to be reflected in the premiums. The extent of the existing subsidy is unknown, although referral fees have been said to be the major source of BTE profit 53 with one insurer charging between £600 and £900 for cases in the fast track. 54 However, the fee debate is far from closed and opinion on all sides is divided. At present it is very much in doubt whether these fees will indeed be abolished.
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Secondly, it is said that premiums may rise because, at present, insurers are not exposed to the true risks involved in providing BTE insurance and this could change.
The argument is that, having bought the insurance only as an add-on to another policy, There is another, stronger, argument supporting the claim that BTE insurers are not facing the true risks. This is that in many BTE cases the insurer merely passes on the claim to its panel solicitor, and thereafter it is dealt with on a CFA basis, with ATE being taken out. The risks of losing thus fall upon other than the BTE insurer. If it were otherwise it is said that BTE premiums would need to rise substantially.
However, the extent to which CFAs and ATEs are being used when there is also BTE is uncertain although DAS, a leading BTE provider, is now said to require solicitors to act using a CFA. 57 In theory it could be argued that there should be few such cases because 60 Instead of an increase in costs, it could be argued that there would be savings and efficiencies produced by dealing with all motor vehicle cases via compulsory BTE. Indeed at present Jackson notes that, in spite of the low premiums charged, BTE insurers in motor claims receive more money than they pay out. Their position would be further safeguarded by one way cost shifting. As a result, an affordable increase in the premiums collected from all drivers may be sufficient to fund the few failed claims that are brought. Of course, because of the much larger group involved in paying these premiums, they would be substantially lower than those presently levied for ATE where it is already known that the claimant has need of legal assistance. Under BTE the many who might need assistance would help pay for the few who actually do. Overall, therefore, the rise in the premium required may be much lower than has been feared.
CONCLUSION
As already noted, Jackson refused to make any recommendation either for or against BTE although initially he was attracted by the potential benefits arising from the wide ranging CLAF scheme. However, he specifically rejected the idea being promoted here that BTE should be made a compulsory feature of motor insurance.
The idea, he says, met with strong opposition.
However, these opponents may not have had in mind the radical changes to funding contained elsewhere in the Jackson report. For example, in spite of the many problems of ATE, it has been thought reckless to remove it for those do not have 
